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[T]he universe is a communion of subjects, not a collection of objects. 
Thomas Berry 
THE PATH 
 In a celebrated passage in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein states 
his view of philosophy: "What is your aim of philosophy?– To shew the fly the 
way out of the fly-bottle."  Although his remark was directed specifically at 
philosophers whom he likened to trapped flies in their metaphysical fly-bottles, 
it can apply to humanity in general insofar as we are linguistic-conceptual 
creatures who live by ontological "pictures" of what the world is like and what we 
are like, all the while assuming these pictures to be the reality itself.  This 
unconsciousness happens because we have internalized – that is, reified– these 
pictures through having been socialized into particular historical, sociocultural, 
intellectual, religious, and other personal and institutional contexts of 
situatedness.  Moreover, as pictures go, some pictures of reality are more 
conducive to our living in harmony with the world and each other than others.  
So, for the sake of living in moral balance, we should choose those pictures that 
are conducive to this balance.  But, if we are not aware that we are living by a 
picture of reality, the question of choosing a more morally viable picture does not 
arise in the first place.  We are entrapped in our metaphysical fly-bottle, unable 
to imagine a different possibility of reality.              
 In this paper, I take up the Wittgensteinian project of showing ourselves a 
way out of the fly-bottle of a certain ontological picture of the world which, I 
shall argue, underlies our destructive treatment of the earth, as well as 
continuing inequities and exploitation in the world.  The first part of my paper 
approaches the problematic ontology first through exposing the hegemony of 
instrumentalism.  The analysis of instrumentalism reveals that its root belief and 
value system is rationalist anthropocentricism.  I then trace the consolidation of 
rationalist anthropocentricism to the seventeenth century's ontological vision of 
the Mechanical Universe.  I shall argue that this ontology has legitimated the 
duality of Mind and Matter, and then reduced Nature to the order of Matter, 
thereby authorizing humanity, whose essence is supposedly the Mind (the so-
called "rational nature"), an absolute dominion over Nature.  The consequence is 
the radical alienation of human presence from the natural world.  Moreover, as I 
shall contend, this ontology is also implicated in the exploitive treatment of 
fellow human beings.      
 Moving beyond the terrain of understanding the problem, the second part 
of the paper addresses the question of practice, arguing that the key to breaking 
out of the mould of the problematic dualistic, mechanist ontology is the recovery 
of our capacity to value the world intrinsically through the cultivation of 
aesthetic consciousness.  I contend that the aesthetic consciousness can restore a 
non-instrumentalist perception of the world, thereby healing the self's existential 
alienation from the world and establishing our consanguinity with it. 
 
THESIS 
 Metaphysical realism is a common affliction: people tend to believe that 
the way they perceive and relate to the world is the way the world is.  Implicit in 
this view is the reasoning that there is a direct one-way causal relation between 
how the world is (that is, independent of our views of it) and the way we 
perceive and relate to it.  I challenge this reasoning on the grounds of 
comparative ontology.  If the world we have in common brings out completely 
different perceptions and responses from different individuals (or peoples), then, 
we have to suspect that different individuals or groups are interpreting the same 
world differently.  Moreover, since interpretation is dependent on the conceptual 
framework, we then have to account for the difference in our responses to the 
world in terms of the different interpretive frameworks we adopt.  
 Here is a case in point:  According to the Haida Nations' traditional beliefs, 
trees are fellow beings who, therefore, had to be treated with the same due 
respect that we normally pay to our fellow human beings.  Thus: "[w]hen a 
Haida basket weaver collects bark for her craft, she asks the consent  [italics 
added] of the cedar tree and sings its praises for having made something as 
beautiful as bark."  Presumably, it may happen sometimes that the cedar tree that 
a crafter asks says "no" to the crafter's asking and then she would have to go to 
another tree.  Or, it may even happen that for now she has to give up on the idea 
of making a basket altogether since no tree would consent to give the bark!   
 Contrast the above to our usual treatment of trees.  Whilst most of us may 
not deny a certain kind and degree of sentience to trees, we do not consider the 
kind and degree sufficient a reason to accord them something like the moral 
status of person as the Haida do.  To us, a tree is a "thing," a commodity, 
although living: we have no intrinsic regard for the tree's own "personal" mode 
of being.  Hence, we have no reservations about cutting down trees for our 
purposes, whether for Christmas trees, for lumber, or just to make a road, 
without considering their own well-being, let alone "consulting" them.   
 The above example illustrates the decisive contribution that a person's 
(culturally acquired) ontological interpretive framework makes to his or her 
perception and conduct.  In other words, how we perceive the world and 
respond to it – that is, our moral orientation – is largely a function of our prior 
understanding of what the world is like and what we are like in relation to the 
world.  Our perception and conduct are the enactment of our metaphysical 
notions about the self and the world.  Hence my thesis that ontology entails ethics.  A 
practical implication of this thesis is that if we want to change the way we act in 
this world, because we have found it to be damaging both to ourselves and to 
other beings, we have to change our ontology.  But, as I shall address later, 
changing our ontology is not a matter of simply adopting a set of new beliefs.   
 Do we have reasons to believe that our own ways in the world are 
damaging?  And what ontology underlies them?  In the next section, I will briefly 
review the state of the world to reveal our ways as rampant instrumentalism.  
Following that, I will trace instrumentalism to rationalist anthropocentricism, 
and the latter, to the ontology of a Mechanical Universe.         
INSTRUMENTALISM     
 We have entered the new millennium to a world of mounting 
environmental and social disintegration.  Everywhere around us are symptoms 
of ecosystems and human communities suffering from stress and imbalance.  To 
name a few notable distress signs: the serious depletion of aquifers and its 
consequence on world food scarcity; the phenomenal scale of deforestation; 
global warming due to increased fossil fuel use and its impact on climatic 
change; the severity of air, water, land pollution; critical soil erosion and its 
impact on agricultural productivity; dwindling biodiversity; increasing hunger 
worldwide and increasing disparity between the rich and the poor.  Moreover, 
consider the estimate that the affluent countries, 20 percent of the world's 
population, consume 80 percent of the world's resources  and that "[i]f 7 billion 
humans were to consume as much energy and other resources as do today's 
industrialized countries, five planets Earth would be needed to satisfy everyone's 
needs."  Or, to think in terms of social justice, consider the fact that "[w]hile the 
industrialized and rich countries have not paid for the ecological damage 
resulting from their activities, many of the consequences and their cost (e.g., 
global warming) will fall upon developing, poor countries," not to mention on 
future generations.   It is now an unequivocal recognition that economic growth 
as the organizing principle for societies around the world–the legacy of the 
western industrial development–and the resulting acquisitive and consumptive 
mode of existence are at the root of our environmental and social deterioration.  
Brown and Flavin's following appraisal is widely shared: 
[T]he western industrial development model that has evolved over the last 
two centuries has raised living standards to undreamed-of levels for one fifth 
of humanity.  It has provided a remarkably diverse diet, unprecedented levels 
of material consumption, and physical mobility that our ancestors could not 
have imagined.  But the fossil-fuel-based, automobile-centered, throwaway 
economy that developed in the West is not a viable system for the world, or 
even for the West over the long term, because it is destroying its 
environmental support systems.      
 The throwaway economy is concerned principally with making profits, 
regardless of such concerns as whether goods and services produced are 
inherently beneficial, whether their benefits are shared widely throughout the 
society, and whether these benefits outweigh detrimental effects of growth on 
the natural environment and other parts of society.  Under the universal ideal of 
profit-making, everything is viewed as resources for human consumption.  
Nothing is spared of being turned into a means to economic growth, which has 
been equated with the nation's "progress." The change in label from "personnel" 
to "human resources" is one of the more recent witnesses to the legitimation 
process of the view that everything, including human beings, is just a means to 
creating financial wealth.  Economy subordinates all human activities to 
production and consumption.  This economism  is a supreme expression of 
instrumentalism.  By all accounts, we live in an age of instrumentalism.  
 Instrumentalism is a mode of perception and interaction wherein entities 
are valued not for what they are in themselves but primarily or only for their 
utility to the self. That is, we do not value the other for its own sake, as an end 
onto itself – as a subject.  Thus we reduce the other to the status of an object.  We 
call this objectivization, that is, turning the other into an object for the self.  The 
flip side of this process is the corresponding subjectivization of ourselves with 
respect to the other: the self becomes the subject.  Now, when an entity is 
objectivized, it is abstracted out of the total complexity of its being and is reduced 
to a material, function, feature, force, or any other single variable.  For example, 
we say Johnny is a problem.  How can a person in all his complexity of being be 
reduced to a problem?  Another example: how can the land which is a 
biocommunity of countless life forms be a monetized property?  Likewise, how 
can animals whom the many billion years of complex evolution equipped to live 
independently of us in their natural habitats be treated solely as our factory-farm 
products?  Here, other beings are abstracted or disembedded out of their own 
totality of being.  Thus reduced, they are then ready to assume a status of raw 
material, means, or abstract function for instrumental treatment.   
 Implicit in the subject-object relationship is value disparity: the subject 
embodies a higher value than its object.  Thus, humanity embodies a higher 
value than the rest of the life forms; also, the folks in the "developed" nations 
have a better, higher life than the "primitive" folks in the "underdeveloped" 
nations.  This value comparison signals normativity: the higher value is what we 
all ought to aspire to and work towards.  Hence the notions of progress and 
development.  If these notions signal social agenda, their private counterpart is 
the notion of "good life."  World over, the North American image of good life 
characterized by conspicuous consumption and mobility is sold to the so-called 
developing and underdeveloped countries.  Examples abound.  Mothers in Third 
World countries who would otherwise breastfeed give baby formula to their 
newborns because that is what the women in developed countries do.  The 
tragedy is that, lacking the developed countries' standard of hygiene, they are 
unable to sterilize their bottles properly and their babies face life-threatening 
infections.  Another example: Countries whose streets are too crowded even for 
comfortable walking aspire to the North American lifestyle of owning and 
driving cars.  Given the global entrenchment of this ideal of a good life, we (the 
folks in the "developed" nations) can hardly blame the "underdeveloped" nations 
for clamoring to copy our throwaway economy.  The "developed" nations have 
successfully managed to convince others to adopt the "value program" behind 
our throwaway economy, which include such values as growth, development, 
money, speed, efficiency, mobility, consumption, and convenience.  And we take 
this success at converting others to our value program as a sure sign of its 
inherent superiority.   
 But the evaluation of success is criteria-specific.  By what criteria are the 
instrumentalist claims of superiority and success supported?  What is the ground 
of justification for such claims?  I shall now turn to exploring what I will term the 
'rationalist anthropocentricism', showing that instrumentalism has its 
justificatory source in this ideology.         
RATIONALIST ANTHROPOCENTRICISM   
 Instrumentalism is a logical consequence of rationalist anthropocentricism, 
the belief that humans are placed at the top of the value pyramid presumably 
because of our superior intelligence or rationality.  The figure of Kant looms 
large in this connection because his rationalist anthropocentricism has had a 
lasting major influence on moral thought to this day.  Kant made a sharp 
distinction between intrinsic value ("kingdom of ends") and instrumental value 
("kingdom of means"),  rightly equating the former, but not the latter, with the 
moral point-of-view.  To quote the famous moral dictum by Kant: "Act in such a 
way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end."  To view something morally is to view it intrinsically: that is, to value it for 
its own sake, as en end onto itself, as a subject.      
 Now, for Kant, to be sure, this intrinsic valuing is to be practiced with 
respect to humanity only because, according to him, only human beings are 
capable of "setting ends."  To wit: "Man has a duty of striving to raise himself 
from the crude state of his nature, from his animality and to realize ever more 
fully in himself the humanity by which he alone is capable of setting ends" 
(emphasis added).  Kant identifies this capacity for setting ends as the "rational 
nature."  We are obligated to treat beings with moral consideration only insofar as 
they possess this rational nature.  Consequently, we have moral duties only to 
other human beings but not to animals or plants.  This does not mean that Kant 
condones abuse and cruelty to non-human beings.  Kant in fact has argued that 
we should not harm animals but the reason is not because they have claims to 
our moral respect but because cruelty is unworthy of us, the rational beings.  
  But why should possession of the rational nature be the criterion for 
ascribing intrinsic value?  Just because intrinsic valuing has to do with valuing 
something as an end itself, it does not follow from this that only the beings 
capable of rational determination of their telos– only human beings, according  
Kant – deserve our intrinsic valuing.  Also, the assumption that only humans are 
capable of setting ends is highly contestable.  Kant's argument here reflects the 
anthropocentric and rationalist bias of his time and culture, the bias we still 
massively suffer from.  This bias radically limits the possibility of our moral 
relationship with the larger world since we can only have a moral relationship 
proper (that is, the relationship of intrinsic valuing) with rational beings.  
Accordingly, with beings deemed to fall short of full rationality, we are justified 
to have merely instrumental relationships.  The logical consequence of this way 
of thinking has been amply borne out in our increasing mass scale destruction of 
the biotic communities world over in the last two centuries.  
 The moral implication of the rationalist anthropocentricism is nowhere 
else more starkly revealed than in the current trend in species extinction.  Under 
this ideology, we believe that, whether it is through God's ordination or the 
workings of evolution, humans are at the apex of the hierarchy of terrestrial 
lifeforms by virtue of our rationality or superior intelligence; hence, naturally (so 
we reason), we have the dominion over the "lower" lifeforms.  The recent 
decades' holocaust of species extinction is a logical consequence of this 
worldview.    Many have tried to dispel the commonly held misconceptions 
about evolution as ascension of lifeforms culminating in homo sapience.  For 
instance, Stephen Jay Gould, eminent  paleontologist and authority on 
Darwinism, argues in Full House that it is variety, not the "upward" movement 
towards complexity, which is the meaning of the word "progress" in the context 
of evolution.  Speaking in metaphor, Gould calls Homo sapience "a tiny twig, 
born just yesterday on an enormously arborescent tree of life."  This humble 
image contrasts sharply with the more conventional image of evolution: the 
pyramid on whose apex stands "man," peerless and sublime.  Notwithstanding 
the weight of expert opinions such as Gould's, many of us, including 
professional scientists, find it simply difficult to let go of the centric and 
hierachical worldview and the accompanying sense of self-importance and 
superiority.  Our whole self-image or -identity is bound up with this view of 
ourselves as superior to other beings on the basis of our higher cognitive capacity. 
  The rationalist bias of anthropocentricism is not bad news only for "non-
human" (note the anthropocentric label) beings: it also threatens the possibility of 
moral relationship with fellow human beings.  For, rationality as a cognitive 
capacity of the so-called "higher order" thinking, that is – symbolic 
representation and manipulation – is not uniformly distributed amongst human 
beings.  Even if we take into consideration that standards of rationality change 
time to time, the fact remains that we always end up with the evaluation that 
some folks are less rational (less 'intelligent', 'smart', and so on) than others.  
Since, according to the Kantian logic, lack of rationality implies not deserving 
intrinsic valuing, we would be justified in our instrumental treatment of people 
deemed to fall below the given norms of rationality.  (And, who sets the norm?)  
Indeed, consider the long history of oppression suffered by women, coloured 
people, children, and others all on the basis of the alleged claims about these 
groups' falling short of full rationality.  This is also how the so-called 
"underdeveloped" nations came to be the suppliers of raw materials and cheap 
labour for the provision of goods and services to the the so-called "developed" 
nations.  Protests against such inequity and injustice have tended to take the 
form of showing that these marginalized and excluded groups were just as 
intelligent, or at least potentially so, as, say, white European males – the norm of 
rationality.  Such rebuttal, however, does not challenge the very criterion of 
conferring  moral perception and treatment, namely possession of rationality.  
For the possibility of more generous moral relationship with the world, including 
fellow human beings, the rationalist criterion is decisively a limiting condition.  
Whence does this criterion come?         
 In the next section, I argue that the rationalist anthropocentricism as the 
source of our superiority complex is predicated upon the historically constructed 
ontology of the Mechanical Universe, an ontology that reduces everything in the 
universe except the Mind to the order of dead matter.  
    
THE MECHANICAL UNIVERSE  
 Although anthropocentricism has been a perennial strand in human 
thought, as can be evidenced by Thales' famous remark about man being the 
measure of all things, it is to the genius of the seventeenth century that we owe 
the most decisive formulation of rationalist anthropocentricism.  The seventeenth 
century marks a radical shift from a by and large animistic ontology and the 
accompanying "participatory consciousness" that pervaded the previous ages to 
the mechanical, rationalist ontology of modernity and its accompanying 
"objectivist consciousness."  (More on these two types of consciousness later.)  
Crucial to this shift in ontology is the emergence of modern experimental science 
supported by the philosophical justification intent on stripping the universe of 
any principle or sense of animism, that is, the sense that the universe is alive.  Of 
the triumvirate architects of modernity–Bacon, Descartes, and Locke–it is to 
Descartes that we owe the definitive argument for the mechanical universe.  
Descartes argued that "[t]he nature of body consists not in weight, hardness, 
colour, or the like, but simply in extension."  By extension, Descartes meant the 
property of "being extended in length, breadth and depth."  The significance of 
this argument lies in its ethical implication that the material things are now seen 
as completely lacking in properties that are capable of affecting us sensuously.  
They merely occupy space!  Nothing else.  Indeed, Descartes goes on to argue 
that "[t]here is no real difference between space and corporeal substance" since 
"the extension consistuting the nature of a body is exactly the same as that 
consistuting the nature of a space."  He thus concludes: "The matter existing in 
the entire universe is thus one and the same, and it is always recognized as 
matter simply in virtue of its being extended."  Having reduced the entire 
material universe to the order of nondescript, indifferent matter, his only account 
for the incredible phenomenality is that "[a]ll the variety in matter, all the 
diversity of its force, depends on motion." 
 Let us consider how Descartes' above reductionism would change our 
relationship with the world.   If material beings of our world have no properties 
other than being extended, then we would be mistaken in our previously held 
belief that they have the power to affect us sensuously and emotionally.  In other 
words, according to the Cartesian reductionism, perception is not a matter of 
sympathy, resonation, or communion between the perceiver and the perceived.  
Cartesian perception is no more than the complex mechanism of lights impacting 
and exciting nerve cells.  Any affective qualities that are adjunct to this 
mechanical process are mentalistic epiphenomena which are best accounted for 
in terms of the perceiver's cognitive ability to attach symbolic significance to 
perception.  If we are moved at all by what we see, the credit goes not to the 
perceived at all but to ourselves, that is, to our well-furnished Mind.     
 I am not here criticizing the scientific validity of the Cartesian account of 
matter and perception.  In fact, we may even grant that, at the level of physics and 
chemistry, all that we have is indeed matter in motion or some other physicalist 
description.  But it is the reductionism, the exclusivity and hegemony of 
physicalist explanations, that is problematic.  Cartesian reductionism leaves no 
room to think of perception as also the perceiver's participation in the perceived, 
that is, as a communion, a transfusion, between them.  Both Berman and 
Skolimowski refer to this sort of perceptual consciousness as participatory mind.  
With the Cartesian ontology, the sympathetic bond that ties the perceiver and the 
world is irrevocably cut, and the two do not come together except as a 
mechanical process of perception.  The world, thus bereft of our participation, 
stands "out there," in ready submission to be manipulated and violated as mere 
objects, "stuffs," and resources.  Stripped of the animating power that makes a 
being its own subject, the world is a collection of objects.   
 Thomas Berry gives us this dramatic account of the Cartesian legacy of the 
Mechanical Universe: 
The devastation of the planet can be seen as a direct consequence of a loss of 
this capacity for human presence to the nonhuman world.  This reached its 
most decisive moment in the seventeenth-century proposal of Rene Descartes 
that the universe is composed simply of "mind and mechanism."  In this 
single stroke [Descartes], in a sense, killed the planet and all its living 
creatures with the exception of the human.  The thousandfold voices of the 
natural world suddenly became inaudible to the human.  The mountains and 
rivers and the wind and the sea all became mute insofar as humans were 
concerned.  The forests were no longer the abode of an infinite number of 
spirit presences but were simply so many board feet of lumber to be 
"harvested" as objects to be used for human benefit.  Animals were no longer 
the companions of humans in the single community of existence.  They were 
denied not only their inherent dignity, but even their rights to habitat. 
That we feel superior to other beings is a direct result of our seeing them as 
belonging to a domain of mere matter and objects.  That we dominate and exploit 
the world is a logical consequence of this perception.  Before we could propose to 
conquer and manipulate Nature–as Francis Bacon persuaded his 
contemporaries–we first had to reduce it to the order of matter.  Such was 
Descartes' philosophical contribution.   
 In the next section, I shall reflect on the psychic consequence of embracing 
the ontology of the Mechanical Universe.  With this discussion, I will bring my 
argument full-circle back to my earlier observations about the connection 
between instrumentalism and consumerism.  
    
ALIENATION 
 The Cartesian self as the possessor of Mind or Reason stands absolutely 
alone in the centre of the immense Mechanical Universe– "a senseless, 
impersonal aggregate of matter in motion" whose intricate workings may 
perhaps provoke awe but not a sense of belonging and kinship.  In this ontology, 
the universe is an absolute Other to the self.  Since there is no sense of 
consanguinity and communion between I as a person and the depersonalized 
world of objects, my foremost sense of being in the world is alienation.  Now, 
alienation is not just a private emotion that we suffer inwardly and has no moral 
impact on the world.  On the contrary, it has grave moral consequences.  Loy 
states: "As long as we experience ourselves as alienated from the world and 
understand society as a set of separate selves, the world is devalued into a field-
of-play wherein we compete to full-fill ourselves."  Alienation is a state of 
existential lack which relentlessly drives one to fill oneself by taking possession 
of the world.  In this understanding, domination and possession are the result of 
alienation.  Alienation creates a radical hunger for the world.  This is the root of 
our century's manic consumerism.  To quote Fromm: "The attitude inherent in 
consumerism is that of swallowing the whole world.  The consumer is the eternal 
suckling crying for the bottle."  He goes on to state: "[T]o consume is one form of 
having, and perhaps the most important one for today's affluent industrial 
societies. . . Modern consumers may identify themselves by the formula: I am = 
what I have and what I consume."  But, it is an insatiable hunger that can never be 
relieved by any amount of possession and consumption.    
 The existential lack that Loy speaks of or Fromm's radical hunger for the 
world is at root the problem of the dualistic consciousness wherein the self, the 
subject "in here," externalizes the world, the object, seeing it as an Other, "out 
over there," entirely separate and categorically different from itself.  This is 
existential alienation.  Since its source is the dualistic consciousness, the way out 
of alienation is to recover the nondual consciousness.  Any other ways of 
overcoming alienation while remaining a dualistic consciousness is bound to fail, 
sooner or later.  Loy explains: "The basic difficulty is that insofar as I feel separate 
(i.e., an autonomous, self-existing consciousness) I also feel uncomfortable, 
because an illusory sense of separateness is inevitably insecure."  All our ways of 
securing the self as the subject in the objectivized world are like pouring water 
into a bottomless pit.  Stop pouring the water; discover that what we thought was a 
bottomless pit is really a deep well filled with water already.  Translation: Stop seeing 
ourselves as self-existing, self-contained, autonomous, and separate from the 
world; realize that we are the world.  Loy again: ". . I can discover that I have 
always been grounded, not as a self-contained being but as one manifestation of 
a web of relationships which encompasses everything.  This solves the problem 
of desire by transforming it.  As long as we are driven by lack, every desire 
becomes a sticky attachment that tries to fill up a bottomless pit."   
 In suggesting the above transformation of consciousness, I do not 
minimize the difficulty involved.  It seems we have nothing less than the weight 
of the human evolution to struggle against.  Loy's assessment of the prospect is 
both cautious and encouraging:  
The evolution of homo sapiens into self-consciousness alienated the human 
species from the rest of the world, which became objectified for us as we 
became subjects looking out at it.  This original sin is passed down to every 
generation as the linguistically-conditioned and socially-maintained delusion 
that each of us is a consciousness existing separately form the world.  Yet if 
this is a conditioning, it raises the possibility of a deconditioning, or a 
reconditioning. 
Conditioning by definition "rules out thought beyond it," as McMurtry has said.  
Before we can convince people to try a course of deconditioning, we have to 
persuade them to even try imagining a different possibility.  Imagine a 
nondualist ontology.  But this may be so challenging that our imagination draws 
a blank: it could use a little stimulation.  In the next section, I shall introduce as a 
stimulant the example of the Chinese ch'i ontology.  This ontology has made a 
commitment to nonduality of self/other, subject/object, and mind/matter.  I am 
particularly interested in the ch'i philosophy because of its suggestion that 
aesthetic apperception, the essence of the contemplative mode of being, is a way 
to cultivating nondual consciousness. 
 
CH'I 
 Ch'i, usually translated as "vital energy," is considered in the classical 
Chinese thought as the basic "stuff" of the cosmos, common to all that exists.  
Moreover, ch'i is psychophysical, meaning that it is both spiritual (mental) and 
material.  The meaning of 'both' here is not a conjunction of two categorically 
separate substances, which would be dualism, but the negation of dualism.  As 
Wei-ming notes, it is not that the Chinese thinkers were unable to analytically 
distinguish spirit or mind from matter.  Rather, they refused to "abandon a mode 
of thought that synthesizes spirit and matter as an undifferentiated whole."  This 
refusal was their moral choice: to embrace dualism would lead to existential 
alienation. 
 The ch'i ontology with its understanding of ch'i as psychophysical "stuff" 
that permeates humans and nonhumans alike would naturally lead to the sense 
of "continuity of being," and therefore, kinship with "the ten thousand things," to 
borrow the Chinese expression for the 'phenomenal world'.  Humans are not 
radically separate from other beings, such as rocks and trees; for, all beings, that 
is, all that exist, are "modalities of energy-matter (ch'i)."  Thus, the following 
statement of the Taoist philosopher Chang Tsai (1020–1077) is more than just a 
figure of speech but expresses exactly how he feels about his relationship with 
this phenomenal world: "Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, and even 
such a small being as I finds an intimate place in their midst. . . all people are my 
brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions."  We cannot get a more 
direct and concrete statement of our consanguinity with the world than this. 
 All beings, whether vegetative, mineral, or animalistic, insofar as they are 
formed of and partake in the dynamic flow of ch'i, are animated, therefore, alive.  
If so, there is not a "thing" that is not alive in this cosmos.  In fact, there are no 
things, that is, objects, in the universe.  I note here how this view converges with 
Thomas Berry's own: "[T]he universe is not a collection of objects but a 
communion of subjects."  Communion presupposes a possibility of sympathetic 
resonance amongst beings, which in turn requires an ontology, such as the ch'i 
philosophy, that sees no categorical separation, therefore essential barrier, 
between different beings.  The moral import of sympathetic resonance as our 
primary mode of interaction with other beings is that it is less likely to lead us 
down the path of control, mastery, and domination – the modernist paradigm in 
which we have been entrapped.      
 The ch'i ontology does not deny that we are endowed with superbly 
developed reason or intellect.  But there is no privileging of the latter.  Given this 
ontology's commitment to a moral view of the cosmos wherein all beings are 
consanguineous and support each other, what is in fact privileged as an especial 
human endowment is this capacity for empathically perceiving and sensing the 
animate, dynamic ch'i  shared by all beings.  I find the passage from Ch'eng Hao 
(1032–1085) especially lucid and useful for my purpose of drawing out an ethical 
implication of the ch'i ontology: 
A book on medicine describes paralysis of the four limbs as absence of 
humanity (pu-jen).  This is an excellent description.  The man of humanity 
regards heaven and earth and all things as one body.  To him there is nothing 
that is not himself.  Since he has recognized all things as himself, can there be 
any limit to his humanity?  If things are not part of the self,  naturally they 
have nothing to do with it.  As in the case of paralysis of the four limbs, the 
vital force (ch'i) no longer penetrates them, and therefore they are no longer 
parts of the self.  
The dualist (of both the objectivist and the subjectivist varieties) who looks out at 
the world as an Other, categorically separate from the self, is enormously 
restricted (above: crippled and paralyzed) in his scope and degree of sentience, 
for his sentience is basically limited to his own atomistic self, often coinciding 
more or less with his physical body at whose epidermal boundary the self ends 
and the world of otherness begins.  Given this ontology, the rest of the vast 
world is often more or less a dead, indifferent, irrelevant, or at the most, usable 
matter to him.  If we subscribe to this ontology, is it any wonder that we would 
not feel much kinship with other beings, whether human or non-human, with 
whom we share the earth?    
 The kind of axiology that goes with the dualist ontology is, naturally, 
instrumentalism.  Values of other beings are never intrinsic but only instrumental.  
Other beings are valued only to the extent that they serve and satisfy our needs: 
this is the mind-set of exploitation.  Even the enjoyment we seek is, more often 
than not, obtained in this exploitive manner: by reducing the other merely or 
predominantly as a means to our pleasure.  The name for this mode of pleasure 
is entertainment.  In contrast, the ch'i metaphysics gives rise to a different basis of 
enjoyment: resonance, attunement, or communion.  These intersubjective modes are 
the basis of the aesthetic sensibility necessary for contemplative appreciation.  
Again I quote Wei-ming who offers a definitive statement on the classical 
Chinese aesthetics . 
To see nature [or any perceptual "object"] as an external object out there is to 
create an artificial barrier which obstructs our true vision and undermines 
our human capacity to experience nature from within.  The internal resonance 
of the vital force is such that the mind, as the most refined and subtle ch'i of 
the human body, is constantly in sympathetic accord with the myriad things 
in nature.  The function of "affect and response" (kan-ying) characterizes 
nature as a great harmony and so informs the mind.  The mind forms a union 
with nature by extending itself metonymically.  Its aesthetic appreciation of 
nature is neither an appropriation of the object by the subject nor an 
imposition of the subject on the object, but the merging of the self into an 
expanded reality through transformation and participation. 
     Above, the particular characterization of aesthetic apperception or 
consciousness, namely its essential connection to nonduality, gives us a strong 
clue as to where we may look for the learning of intrinsic valuing: in the 
contemplative mode of being.  In the following penultimate section, I investigate 
this possibility through an example of Frederick Franck's zen practice of drawing.    
 
TECHNOLOGIES OF CONTEMPLATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
 Any sustained practice conditions and forms a particular mode of 
consciousness, or if you like, a way of seeing and being in the world.  I shall 
adopt Foucault's handy term "technologies of the self" to denote such practices 
that the self can undertake: ". . . technologies of the self. . permit individuals to 
effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, 
so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality."  The specific state we seek after, 
however, is nonduality, and the particular way of relating to the world, intrinsic 
valuing.  Since what we are interested in is not just knowing the various possible 
technologies but understanding just how these work, I shall again look at a 
particular example with the aim of gleaning some general principles.  
 For Frederick Franck, drawing is a transformative technology whereby the 
usual tendency to look at the world as a collection of objects gives way to seeing 
the world nondually.  But just how is the transformation achieved?  What is the 
key to this practice?  Succinctly put, it is intense, total, and sustained attention.  
Such attention disrupts the usual pattern recognition that we are amazingly 
efficient at.  For example, one quick glance is enough to identify something as a 
forest.  After such identification, either we move on to thinking of something else, 
say the next pay cheque, or we engage in a discursive thinking about the forest, 
say, now much lumber there is.  In either case, what does not happen is a 
sustained contemplation on the object, the kind of sensuous dwelling in the 
perceived that would enable one to get to know the other intimately.  Franck 's 
following statement illustrates well the difference between looking as 
identification and seeing as in-dwelling: "Driving through the redwoods of 
California I see "timber," until I stop and sit down in front of one tree and start 
drawing it, with or without pen or paper." 
 Thus the first act we have to accomplish in learning to see is the stop.  We 
have to stop the usual rushing-around with discursive labeling and calculative 
chattering.  Without this stop, we cannot achieve enough inner silence, that is, 
freedom from the fracturing commotion of the discursive mind, to undertake a 
sustained attending to the other.  The act of drawing in Franck's practice is one 
way to distill and sustain the attention.  To note, drawing as a technology of the 
self does not aim at a particular artistic product: beautiful or realistic or other 
manner of drawings are not the point.  One knows when the drawing is going 
well by self-checking the quality of concentration and engagement: how focused 
and quiet one's mind is and how intensely one's attention is engaged by the 
perceived.  Franck states: "The bad drawings happen when, as I start to draw, the 
world remains closed to me.  I am a mere onlooker, "He is Italian," "She looks 
ridiculous," goes through my head. . . As long as I recognize objects and name 
them, I am impotent.  There is no greater contrast than between recognizing and 
seeing.  Drawing is, before all else, seeing."   
 When we direct such an intense attention to an "object" of our face-to-face 
encounter, there occurs this singular experience of the "subject" and the "object," 
the self and the other coming together, co-present and co-emergent.  Again, here 
is Franck: "Every dot, every line on the paper had gone through my whole 
organism.  I was no longer the onlooker. . . Drawing the landscape, I 'became' 
that landscape, felt unseparated from it."  It is as though, finally, the two 
arbitrarily separated parts – the perceiver and the perceived – of one whole come 
together to belong to each other.  This is healing and end of alienation.  As a 
result, a tremendous sense of aliveness is released: the world is alive, and one 
feels its pulse and rhythm within oneself.   One comes to dwell once again in an 
animated universe in which all beings are consanguineous with oneself.  
Whether one calls it the work of ch'i or some other force, it really does not matter.  
It is the quality of experience that matters.  Here is Franck again commenting on 
this sense of animated universe: "One day I was drawing a cow in a meadow 
near our house.  As I stood drawing, our eyes met, and at that instant she 
stopped being 'a cow'.  She became this singular fellow being whose warm 
breath mixed with my own in the cold fall air."     
 Of course, drawing is not the only "technology of consciousness" capable 
of delivering us to nondual experiences.  All contemplative endeavours requiring 
a sustained, total, selfless attention, whether found in arts, sciences, or other 
endeavours, can be such technologies insofar as they yield the nonduality of the 
subject and the object.  However, I would like to emphasize the word "sciences" 
just because our conventional way of thinking of sciences entrenches dualism 
between subject (the scientist) and object (the world).  But there is no apriori 
reason why scientists cannot experience nonduality with respect to the objects 
they are working with.  Nobel laureate Barbara MaClintock is a good example.  
Here are her own words describing her in-dwelling experience: "I found that the 
more I worked with [maize chromosomes under the microscope] the bigger and 
bigger [they] got, and when I was really working with them I wasn't outside, I 
was down there.  I was part of the system. . . It surprised me because I actually 
felt as if I were right down there and these were my friends."  She said the same 
about her cornfield: "No two plants are exactly alike.  They're all different, and as 
a consequence, you have to know that difference. . . I start with the seedling, and 
I don't want to leave it.  I don't feel I really know the story if I don't watch the 
plant all the way along.  So I know every plant in the field.  I know them 
intimately, and I find it a great pleasure to know them." 
 It is up to each individual to discover particular "arts" congenial to her 
being and can take her most deeply into the experience of nonduality.  Franck 
affirms this understanding: ". . I learned that every art has its mystery, its 
spiritual rhythm, its myo in Japanese.  The myo is intimately related to all the arts.  
The true artist, the artist-within, is the one who is really moved by the myo, the 
as-is-ness of things, of their intrinsic, unhallowed sacredness."  For some, it may 
be pottery; for others, poetry.  From zazen (sitting meditation) to scientific 
observations, the art that disciplines the mind-body-heart to alter one's 
perception of the world, from that of alienation, duality, and instrumentalism to 
that of co-emergence, participation, and intrinsic valuing, are suitable 




 Ours are nations addicted to action and production.  We measure progress 
by how much we produce and consume, consequently, how much we alter the 
world.  This is the instrumentalist orientation – the "having" mode.  The opposite 
is the intrinsic orientation, the "being" mode, wherein we enter into a sustained 
contemplation and intrinsic appreciation of the phenomenal world.  Obviously, 
we cannot live solely in one orientation.  We need both but in balance.  By all 
accounts, this balance has been broken in the present regime of instrumentalism.  
We need to regain this balance by recovering the intrinsic orientation.  Essential 
to this orientation is the aesthetic sensibility: the ability to dwell in the sustained 
contemplation of the phenomenal world and to experience the fullness of Being.  
Lacking this aesthetic sensibility, we are unable to "metabolize" the infinitely rich 
nutrients of Life in this phenomenal world.  We work harder than ever, produce 
and consume more than ever, and yet we feel evermore psychically empty and 
starved.  This problematic situation is analogous to the metabolic disorder where 
the afflicted is hungry all the time, is addicted to food, and eats ravenously, but is 
unable to derive proper nourishment.  As a treatment for our existential 
metabolic disorder, I have suggested the cultivation of contemplative, aesthetic 
consciousness.  I am convinced that the more we can dwell in the 
contemplative/aesthetic mode of being, the less damage we will incur to the 
world through hyperactivity and hyper-production/consumption.  "Do less and 
be more" should be our motto.    
 In closing, I would like to share the first stanza of a poem by Daisaku 
Ikeda.  The other day on campus where I teach, I chanced upon an exhibit of 
Ikeda's "Photo Essays" which was accompanied by a few poems of his own.  
What I have been calling the contemplative, aesthetic consciousness, Ikeda calls 
the "poetic mind."  
 
Poetry is the spiritual bond 
That links humanity, society, and the universe. 
The gaze of the poet is directed at the heart; 
He sees things as more than mere objects. 
At times the poet converses with the trees and the grasses, 
Talks with stars, greets the sun, and befriends all beings. 
In these he sees life and breathes life into them, 
Finding in the changing phenomena of the world 
The unchanging principles of the universe. 
 
  
